Let T be an w-person cooperative game with a (not necessarily superadditive) characteristic function v(B). We assume that T is normalized so that v(B)^0
for each coalition B, and v(i)~0 for i=l, 2, • • • , n. Let B = 5i, J5 2 , • • • , B m be a coalition structure, i.e., a partition of the set N= {1, 2, • • • , n\ into m nonempty coalitions. An outcome of the game with this coalition structure can be represented by a payoff configuration (x; B), where the payoff vector X2=(#i, #2, • • • , x n ) represents the amount which the players receive. If we restrict ourselves to individually rational payoff configurations (i.r.p.c/s), i.e., to payoff configurations with x^O coordinate wise, then x must lie in the space Z(B)s5iX5 Let (x; B) be an i.r.p.c. for a game I\ and let v and \x be two distinct players in a coalition Bj of B. COROLLARY. There always exists an x such that (x; iV)GM^.
4. On the basis of these results, B. Peleg presents an ingenious proof in the subsequent research announcement [4] , that for each coalition structure B, for a game T, there exists a payoff vector x, such that (x; B)GMf. His proof is indirect, and does not furnish more properties of M^. Therefore, a direct proof is also desirable.
There exist examples which show that the sets Mj(x) are not necessarily convex. From the definitions of these sets it follows that they are closed polyhedra. If one could show that these polyhedra are acyclic, i.e., have only trivial homology groups, then one could use the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed-point theorem [2] to prove Peleg's result in a direct fashion. So far, we know that Mj(x) is acyclic if the coalition Bj contains less than 4 players, and we did not find counterexamples for larger coalitions. We also know that Ej(x) are always contractible over themselves to a point, and hence they are acyclic. These results follow from: The proof is straightforward, once one realizes that these conditions make it "more difficult" for player 2 to object and "easier" for player 1 to counter object.
